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JUDGE DILLON DID NOT INVENT DILLON’S RULE: ORIGINS,
ULTRA VIRES AND EXPRESSED POWER FOR MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CRITICISM CALLING
FOR HOME RULE POWER, FOCUSED ON IDAHO
THORPE P. ORTON*
ABSTRACT
Judge Dillon did not invent “Dillon’s rule.” In public administration and
municipal law, a mythos has long existed that Iowa judge John F. Dillon
invented what we call Dillon’s rule in the 1860s. Dillon’s rule is actually
just another name for the doctrine of “ultra vires.” His jurisdictional
locale in a conservative rural state without cosmopolitan large cities
has been used to undermine and politicize the rule. In short, Dillon’s
rule holds that municipal corporations have only that power expressly
granted to them by the legislature and those other powers necessary
to fulfill their express mission. Conversely, “home rule” cities may
exercise any powers not expressly prohibited by the legislature, i.e.,
residual power. The Cooley doctrine went a step further, endowing
localities with an inherent right to govern themselves. In Judge Dillon’s
two famous cases he relied upon at least twenty-eight existing court
opinions and a vibrant jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court
paved the American way for the doctrine of ultra vires in an 1804 case,
the American source for Dillon’s rule. The first written reference to the
rule in the corporation arena appears to be in Blackstone’s ninth
edition in 1783. The earliest written legal usage of the term ultra vires
in the English-American legal tradition appears in Lord Kames’ 1760
treatise. The United States Supreme Court has expressed approval of
the rule. Critics have aggressively attacked Dillon’s rule, but there are
historical and rational reasons for the rule, which pre-date Judge
Dillon’s writings. It requires a careful analysis of each state’s
constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as case law, in order to
determine whether a state is a Dillon’s rule state or somewhere else
on the spectrum. Idaho is a Dillon’s rule state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the limited power of municipal corporations, widely
known as Dillon’s rule and the “doctrine of expressed powers.”1 There has been a
“limited amount of research” done in the “local policy leadership” area, including
legal barriers.2 This paper addresses perhaps the main legal barrier. It is also
intended to correct the framework for discussing Dillon’s rule. I use my home state
of Idaho as an example of the adoption, application, and evolution of the rule. Idaho
is a Dillon’s rule state.3
Scholarly texts routinely tell us or imply that former Iowa Supreme Court Chief
Justice and United States District Court Judge John F. Dillon of Iowa is the inventor
of the rule.4 Notably, however, in the fourth edition (2014) of their text, Smith and
1. See generally James R. Alexander, Dillon’s Rule Under the Burger Court: The Municipal Liability
Cases, 18 PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM, Winter 1988, at 127.
2. Robert F. Blair & Anthony M. Starke Jr., The Emergence of Local Government Policy Leadership:
A Roaring Torch or a Flickering Flame?, 49 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV., 275, 277 (2017).
3. Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992).
4. CHARLES R. ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 119 (McGrawHill Book Co., Inc. 2d ed. 1967) (1960); DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES: AUTONOMY,
POLITICS, AND POLICY 2, 64, 70-75 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2003); ANN O’M. BOWMAN & RICHARD C. KEARNEY, STATE
AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT 43 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1990); TODD DONOVAN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS:

INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM 353 (Cengage Learning Wadsworth 2d ed. 2011) (2009); THOMAS R. DYE & SUSAN
A. MACMANUS, POLITICS IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 211-12 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 11th ed. 2003) (1969); DANIEL
JUDAH ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 181 (Harper & Row 2d ed. 1972); VIRGINIA GRAY
& PETER EISINGER, AMERICAN STATES AND CITIES 42 (HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 1991); VIRGINIA GRAY &
ROBERT L. HANSON, POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 51 (CQ Press 9th ed. 2008);
NICHOLAS HENRY, GOVERNING AT THE GRASSROOTS: STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 181-82 (Prentice-Hall Inc. 1980);
DUANE LOCKARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 129-30 (The MacMillan Co. 3d 1983); G.
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Greenblatt allude to my contention that Dillon’s rule is really an expression of the
law of ultra vires.5 Legal sources also commonly acknowledge the source of local
government power to be Dillon’s rule.6 Students and scholars of public
administration and municipal law, lawyers, and courts routinely refer to Dillon’s
rule, thereby immortalizing and crediting Judge Dillon with its creation. I urge that
we look beyond the loaded term “Dillon’s rule”—the nomenclature—and approach
this subject with an open mind, tabula rasa.
As a threshold matter, it is noteworthy that cities exercise two types of
powers: (1) “governmental” or public powers, which are legislative and regulatory
functions; and (2) “proprietary” or private powers, which consist of the “internal
financing and administration of the city and provision of utilities and services for
the benefit of city residents.”7 Proprietary functions can also be considered
“private” functions, “analogous to the functions of a private corporation,” which do
not relate to traditional aspects of governing.8 Government functions can be
considered “public” functions, such as legislative, executive, and judicial actions
“required or commanded by law” and “for the general public good.”9 The
distinction is historical and now mostly a legal and academic curiosity, but it was
once relevant for determining sovereign immunity from a lawsuit (if the act was
governmental, suit was not allowed, but if the act was proprietary, suit was
allowed), and it can be very difficult to define with precision.10 For our purposes,

THEODORE MITAU, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: POLITICS AND PROCESSES 407–09 (Charles Scribner’s Sons
1966); JACK RABIN & DON DODD, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 103,106 (Marcel Dekker, Inc.
1985); KEVIN B. SMITH & ALAN GREENBLATT, GOVERNING STATES AND LOCALITIES 365–67 (CQ Press 4th ed. 2014);
KEVIN B. SMITH ET AL., GOVERNING STATES AND LOCALITIES 439, 451 (CQ Press 3d ed. 2011).
5. SMITH & GREENBLATT, supra note 4, at 365.
6. See, e.g., Michael C. Moore, Home Rule or Legislative Control?, 14 Idaho L. Rev. 143, 146 (1977)
[hereinafter Moore (1977)]; see also Gregory Taylor, Dillon’s Rule: A Check on Sheriffs’ Authority to Enter
287(g) Agreements, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1053, 1060 (2019). The use of the term Dillon’s rule is so ubiquitous
that it receives its own entry in the preeminent legal dictionary, echoing the common definition and
even crediting it to Judge Dillon. Dillon’s Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). A Lexis Advance
search revealed 283 court decisions referring to Dillon’s rule.
7. Moore (1977), supra note 6, at 144.
8. Id. at 144–46, citing Wm. Don Parkinson, Sovereign Immunity in Idaho, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 267, 269
(1971).
9. Id.
10. SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35.01 at 3-15 (Matthew Bender &
Co. 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter STEVENSON (ANTIEAU)]. See Brian H. Hess, Comment: The
Planning/Organizational Dichotomy: A Specious Approach to the Discretionary Function Exception in the
Idaho Tort Claims Act, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 225, 232-34 (2003) (discussing the old government-proprietary
powers line of demarcation for suing the government).
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this distinction is relevant because Dillon’s rule has been held to apply to the
exercise of governmental powers and not to proprietary powers.11
The actual origin of Dillon’s rule can be traced to legal authority that pre-dates
Judge Dillon’s two famous court decisions (Clark and Cedar Rapids), one-volume
treatise, and, his magnum opus, the multi-volume commentaries on municipal
law.12 Indeed, Judge Dillon’s fame for this rule is no doubt a result of his extensive
writings on municipal law during an era of tremendous local government
corruption. He was clearly an aficionado on the subject, and “was the author of the
first important treatise on the law of municipal corporations.”13
In fact, the written roots of Dillon’s rule in corporations law can be traced back
(at the least) to the famed English law professor and Solicitor General to Her
Majesty William Blackstone’s ninth edition of his commentaries on English law in
1783, wherein he wrote that corporations have all such powers “unless they are
contrary to the laws of the land, and then they are void.”14 Brice observes:
In old times, as we have seen, corporations were considered to have
most of the powers—the due exercise of such powers being secured by
the imposition of certain formalities—and to be subject to the greater
part of the obligations of ordinary citizens. But of late, from the
introduction and development of the doctrine of Ultra Vires, these

11. Hagan v. City of Barre, 2009 Vt. Super. LEXIS 27, 31 n.13 (Vt. Super. Ct., June 29, 2009);
Hunters, Anglers & Trappers Ass’n of Vermont, Inc. v. Winooski Valley Park Dist., 913 A.2d 391, 395 (Vt.
2006) (citing JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 109, 182 (Little, Brown
and Co. 5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter Dillon’s Commentaries]); Boise Dev. Co. v. Boise City, 167 P. 1032,
1034–35 (Idaho 1917).
12. See Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199, 209 (1865); City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo.
River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868); JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Chicago:
James Cockcroft & Co.) (photo. reprt. 2011) (1872) [hereinafter Dillon’s Treatise]; Dillon’s Commentaries,
supra note 11.
13. A.E.S., Dillon’s Rule: The Case for Reform, 68 Va. L. Rev. 693, 693 (1982). There was at least
one English treatise on municipal corporation law published several decades before Judge Dillon’s
treatise. JOHN W. WILLCOCK, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF SKETCH OF THEIR
HISTORY AND A TREATISE ON MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO (London, William Benning, Law Bookseller, 52,
Fleet Street) (photo. reprt. 2011) (1827) [hereinafter Willcock].
14. SEWARD BRICE, A TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES 5 (Reprint, Scholar Select, 2015)
(London, Stevens & Haynes, Law Publishers) (1874) [hereinafter Brice] (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 308 (Oxford, UK 9th ed. 2016) (photo. reprt. 2016) (1783). With respect to the use of the
term ultra vires in other legal contexts—deeds and covenants—it has been said that the earliest
published use of the term can be found in Lord Kames’ (Henry Home’s) ancient legal treatise PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY, first published in 1760, wherein he observed that the common law recognizes “[a] principle in

logics, [t]hat will without power cannot produce any effect” and is, therefore, “ultra vires.”); D.L., The
American Law Register, (1852-1891), 513–26, 514 (U. OF PENN. LAW REV.) (1877) (citing and quoting LORD
HENRY HOME KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, 201 (Reprint, Scholar Select, 2015) (Alex, Laurie & Co. 3rd ed.)
(1778)).
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powers and obligations have been, especially as regards some kinds of
corporations, considerably curtailed.15
Brice, Reese, and Field go on to discuss the evolution of the doctrine in English
jurisprudence, the most important cases being Colman and East Anglian Railways,
the former involving a railroad company that wanted to get into the steamboat
business, which was ultra vires, and the latter emphasizing that an illegal contract
entered into by a railroad company was also ultra vires.16 Reese recognizes the
Colman case as “[t]he first reported case touching the application of doctrines of
ultra vires in England.”17
This earlier and widespread precedent included the private and public
corporation law doctrine of ultra vires, a doctrine that has been specifically applied
by the state of Idaho’s courts to limit local governmental power.18 The Latin term
ultra vires means, quite simply, “beyond the powers,” and is “the modern
nomenclature for acts of a corporation which exceed or are beyond the powers
conferred by law upon the legal entity.”19
As Alexander observed, Dillon’s rule is also inextricably connected with what
he calls “the doctrine of expressed powers.”20 In its simplest and most generic
meaning, “expressed power” is legally defined as “[a] power explicitly granted by a
legal instrument,” “[a] power that is granted to all corporations alike by statute,
whether inserted in the charter or not,” and “[a] power statutorily allowed to
corporations whose incorporators take advantage of it by reserving it in the
corporate charter.”21 Bluntly, this doctrine arose in the United States as a result of
the Tenth Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights written by James Madison and
ratified in 1791: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.”22 Instead of using the word “expressed,” the Tenth
15. BRICE, supra note 14, at 28.
16. Id. at 27-35; REUBEN A. REESE, THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS: BEING
A

CONCISE PRESENTATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE POWERS AND LIABILITIES OF PRIVATE AND

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Scholar Select, 2015) (Chicago: T.H. Flood & Co.) (1897), at 9, 21, 39, 53, 183,
§§ 9, 21, 39, 53, and 136; GEORGE WASHINGTON FIELD, THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES, 9-41 and 190-99 (Reprint,
Scholar Select, 2015) (Des Moines: Mills & Co. Law Publishers) (1881); Colman v. Eastern Counties
Railway Co., 10 Beav. 1 (1846); Eastern Anglian Railway Co. v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., 11 C.B. 775
(1851).
17. REESE, supra note 16, at 55, § 39.
18. Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992).
19. REESE, supra note 16, at 26, § 17; Ultra vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
20. Alexander, supra note 1, at 131.
21. Express Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Amendment speaks of powers “delegated” to the federal government, the
expressed powers.23 The states retain all residual powers, much like the home rule
concept or, perhaps more accurately, the Cooley doctrine. The linkage between
“expressed power” and the Tenth Amendment was perhaps first most directly
made by Chief Justice Chase in dissent in the Legal Tender Cases in 1870,24 but the
essential logic of the doctrine certainly flows from an early case cited by
Alexander,25 wherein the United States Supreme Court held:
The soil and the people within [the geographical limits of the United
States] are under the political control of the Government of the United
States, or of the states of the Union. There exist within the broad
domain of sovereignty but these two. There may be cities, counties, and
other organized bodies with limited legislative functions, but they are
all derived from, or exist in, subordination to one or the other of
these.26
Finally, the earliest use of the wording of “expressed power” in the municipal
corporation area appears to occur in 1884 in Louisiana in the Scott’s Executors
case.27
The criticism of Dillon’s rule can be quite polemical and jejune, peppered with
just enough politics to create a natural division. A pair of Idaho legal scholars,
Professor of Law James S. Macdonald and then-J.D. candidate Jacqueline R. Papez,
focus on the widely-held belief that the law of limited power for local government
was created by an Iowa judge in the late 1860s, at a time of bribery by railroad
companies of local governmental entities and other anachronisms, essentially a
product of the zeitgeist.28 Blair and Starke also subtly dig at Judge Dillon’s
jurisdictional chic by claiming that the rule was “a legal interpretation by a
nineteenth century Iowa state judge . . . .”29 Macdonald and Papez’s argument
largely mirrors the history set forth by Grumm and Murphy, which focuses on the
peculiarities of the 19th century in the United States and credited Judge Dillon with
“formulat[ing]” the rule.30 Richardson also proclaims that Judge Dillon “first set out
the rule” in 1865.31 The Idaho legal scholars call it “the single most regressive
feature of the current legal landscape surrounding the state-local government

23. Id.
24. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 573 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
25. Alexander, supra note 1, at 131.
26. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886).
27. Scott’s Ex’rs v. Shreveport, 20 F. 714, 715–17 (Cir. Ct. La. 1884).
28. James S. Macdonald & Jacqueline R. Papez, Over 100 years Without True “Home Rule” in
Idaho: Time for Change, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 599–600 (2010).
29. Blair & Starke, supra note 2, at 278.
30. John G. Grumm & Russell D. Murphy, Dillon’s Rule Reconsidered, 416 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 120, 121 (1974).
31. Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Dillon’s Rule is from Mars, Home Rule is from Venus: Local Government
Autonomy and the Rules of Statutory Construction, 41 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 661, 664 (2011).
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relationship,” dismiss it as the “19th century world-view of an Iowa judge,” and
even go so far as to call Dillon’s rule the “Antichrist.”32
There are many other critics of Dillon’s rule and the doctrines of expressed
power and ultra vires. In his treatise, Field recognizes that “[t]he doctrine has been
frequently . . . characterized as odious, ungracious, and unwelcome.”33 A more
recent critic claims the doctrine has an “elusive nature” and is not needed in our
modern world, with “increased expectations and [the] expanded role of modern
local government,” that it has a “low predictive value” that stymies cities from
understanding their actual powers, that judges are forced to decipher often vague
legislative intent (this is an odd argument given that if your powers are specifically
listed, they should be easier to understand), and that it brings the “dual evils” of
not really bringing cities under state control, yet hamstringing effective
administration at the local level.34 Louise Byer Miller notes that “states have found
it increasingly necessary to devolve substantial power to their political
subdivisions,” that the “rule . . . runs counter to the American tradition of local
government,” and that it is not always clear “as to what constitutes a local
matter.”35 She also bemoans that the United States Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Burger “reinforced” Dillon’s rule and “set back the home rule movement.”36
Bowman and Kearney emphasize that the “controversial” Community
Communications opinion reaffirms that “local governments continue to be held to
the standards of Dillon’s Rule.”37 Reese refers to “that disturbing element in the law
of corporations known as the ‘[d]octrine of [u]ltra [v]ires . . . .’”38
Critically, as a threshold matter, it must be recognized that the law existed in
multiple jurisdictions before Judge Dillon’s pronouncements, and there are a variety
of reasons, including the basic reasons of Tenth Amendment federalism and state
sovereignty and the Constitutional separation of powers, which buttress what we
widely call Dillon’s rule.39 Idaho’s courts have rejected legal arguments made under
the Idaho Constitution and statutes that localities have been granted a general right
32. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 599–600.
33. FIELD, supra note 16, at 580 (emphasis in original).
34. A.E.S., supra note 13, at 701–03, 705, 711.
35. Louise Byer Miller, The Burger Court’s View of the Relationship Between the States and Their
Municipalities, 17 PUBLIUS 85, 88 (1987).
36. Id. at 91–92. Miller focuses on two Burger Court-era decisions: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). These
opinions and their recognition that cities are not sovereign has remained viable to modern times in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216
(2013).
37. BOWMAN & KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 44.
38. REESE, supra note 16, at 26.
39. See infra Section IV discussion and citations.
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of powers, reinforcing Idaho’s long-standing commitment to Dillon’s rule or,
perhaps more appropriately, ultra vires or the doctrine of express powers.40
Indeed, a historical perspective reveals that cities of limited or defined powers
have ancient origins. For example, Judge Dillon wrote that “[t]he first distinct
recognition of a municipal corporation was in the 18th [year] of Henry VI (A.D.
1439), with reference to the English city Kingston-upon-Hull, which had an express
charter of incorporation granted to it [by Henry VI] . . . .”41 An older English legal
scholar identifies St. Riquier in France as the oft-claimed earliest municipal
corporation, or “commune” in France, under King Louis VI in 1126.42 A “commune”
is “the smallest French territorial division for administrative purposes.”43 There is
some evidence that King Louis VI made Corbie a commune three years before St.
Riquier.44
The history of cities goes back many centuries, but one scholar affirms “[t]he
great municipal revolution . . . broke out in the first years of the twelfth century.”45
Thierry claims that Amiens became a commune in France in 1117, and the second
volume of his two-volume treatise explores pre-twelfth century municipalities in
western Europe, tracing from the Roman period.46 Another source indicates the
southwestern city of Oloron in France may have been the earliest commune in
1080, and other early French communes include Hainaut (1200, and perhaps as
early as 1171), Saint-Omer (1127), and Morlâas (1101).47 Since there is “no
connecting link between ancient [Roman] “leges municipales” (i.e., municipalities)
and the charters of the 1100s,” it is probably safe to trace the modern municipal
corporation to the twelfth century.48 The ultimate and definitive tracing of the
origin, source, and extent/limitation of powers of cities is a veritable rabbit hole
that could lead back to even more distant empires and multijurisdictional entities
that pre-date the known written record, and it seems reasonable that a more
thorough historical search would likely turn up earlier cities of limited powers.
40. N. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 343 P.3d 1086, 1092–93 (Idaho 2015).
41. Dillon’s Treatise, supra note 12, at 58.
42. WILLCOCK, supra note 13, at 4–5.
43. Commune, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2010).
44. ARTHUR HASSALL, A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 476–1871, at 51 (London, MacMillan & Co.
1897). “Coutumes” were “local customary laws” that “refer[] to both the customary laws and usages of
a region and to any collection of these laws.” JEAN CASWELL & IVAN SIPKOV, THE COUTUMES OF FRANCE IN THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 3 (2006). “Coutumier” is also defined as “[a] collection
of the customs, usages, and forms of practice in use over many centuries in France.” Coutumier, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (Deluxe 10th ed. 2014). The issue of what was the first commune is a bit of a moving
target, with another source claiming that the first one was granted in the 11th century in France under
Philip I, Le Mans in 1072. XVII ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 35 (Spencer Baynes & W. Robertson Smith eds.,
1905).
45. 2 AUGUSTIN THIERRY, FORMATION AND PROGRESS OF THE TIERS ÉTAT OR THIRD ESTATE IN FRANCE 131
(Reprint, Scholar Select 1859).
46. Id. at 149, 153, 180-81.
47. CASWELL & SIPKOV, supra note 44, at 41, 44, 47, 61.
48. JEAN BRISSAUD & MARCEL PLANIOL, PART III—FRANCE IN A GENERAL SURVEY OF EVENTS, SOURCES, PERSONS
AND MOVEMENTS IN CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY 222 (Reprint, Scholar Select 1912).
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Willcock also provides us with a useful typology of cites:
The Authority by which corporations may warrant their existence, for it
is more doubtful whence some actually derived it, is threefold. First,
Prescription; that is, because they have existed from the reign of king
Richard the First, or so long that no period subsequent to that time can
be shown when they did not exist, they are entitled to continue.
Secondly, Act of Parliament; for whatever is by that declared lawful
must be acknowledged, and its institutions cannot be impugned.
Thirdly, the King’s Charter: this power has immemorially existed in the
Crown, but the charter is wholly inoperative until it has been accepted
by those to whom it is offered.49
Brice gives us a longer typology of cities: (1) Common law, which arise from a
sort of “universal assent,” including from the king; (2) Prescription, which are cities
that have existed from “time immemorial” without charter or act, presumably lost;
(3) Implication, which are cities with duties imposed upon them, such as by the king;
(4) Charter, which are cities created by “letter patent from the Crown;” and (5)
Parliamentary, which are cities created by act of Parliament.50
Finally, in their legal tome on private corporations, Angell and Ames give an
excellent overview of the origin and development of cities, focusing on the Roman
Empire and the limitations and rights that were granted to the citizens of cities in
various circumstances.51
II. DILLON’S RULE
It is appropriate to set forth the basics of what scholars and practitioners of
public administration and municipal law have come to know as Dillon’s rule, which
is a rule of statutory construction.52 A competing doctrine is “home rule,” which
refers to a presumption that states have affirmatively and generally granted the

49. WILLCOCK, supra note 13, at 16.
50. BRICE, supra note 14, at 29–31.
51. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE, 9–
16 (2d ed. 1843, Scholar Select) (2015).
52. Richardson, supra note 31, at 663. A rule of statutory construction is a rule that dictates how
a court will engage in the “act or process of interpreting a statute,” or “the principles developed by
courts for interpreting statutes.” Statutory Construction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Thus,
Dillon’s rule is simply a rule that courts created and follow that results in narrow interpretations of
municipal power statutes; any doubts about expressed power are resolved against the municipal
corporation. HOMER H. SWANEY, ESSAY ON ULTRA VIRES, 2 (Washington, D.C.: Rufus H. Darby, Printer) (1883).
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power to a local governmental entity to enact policies on matters of local concern,
a term that is also widely used in academic and legal circles.53
The term “Dillon’s rule” is typically traced to two Iowa Supreme Court
opinions, Clark and Cedar Rapids.54 Shortly after these cases were published, Judge
Dillon also set forth his rule in his famous 1872 treatise on municipal corporation
law and again in his multi-volume commentaries on municipal corporation law.55
In the first case, Clark, Judge Dillon authored an opinion concerning the
authority of certain city officials to sign warrants without receiving any express
authorization from the city council. Judge Dillon famously wrote:
It is a familiar and elementary principle that municipal corporations
have and can exercise such powers, and such only, as are expressly
granted, and such incidental ones as are necessary to make those
powers available and essential to effectuate the purposes of the
corporation; and these powers are strictly construed.56
In the second case, dealing with the authority of a city over its streets, Cedar
Rapids, Judge Dillon set out the rule with more flair:
The true view is this: Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and
derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes
into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We
know of no limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves
are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature.57
In the Clark and Cedar Rapids opinions, Judge Dillon expressly relied on
twenty-eight reported court decisions and two treatises to reinforce his holding.58
The court decisions come from seven jurisdictions, including thirteen from New
53. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 598-609; Heidi Koenig & Amy Kise, Law and the City
Manager: Beginning to Understand the Sources of Influence on the Management of Local Government,
6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY, 443, 451 n.3 (1996); BERMAN, supra n.4, at 63; Lydia R. Wilson & Robert
McCreight, Public Emergency Laws & Regulations: Understanding Constraints & Opportunities, 9 J.
HOMELAND SEC. & EMER. MGMT., n.2, art. 7, 8 (2012).
54. Richardson, supra note 31, at 664-65; Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199, 209–12 (1865);
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
55. Dillon’s Treatise, supra note 12 § 5, at 101-05; Dillon’s Commentaries, supra note 11 § 237, at
448-51.
56. Clark, 19 Iowa at 212.
57. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa at 475.
58. Id. at 456-82; Clark, 19 Iowa at 201–28.
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York, seven from Massachusetts, and two from the United States Supreme Court.59
The earliest two cases cited are from 1804.60
Judge Dillon emphasizes that the fundamental principle underlying all
corporations in the United States is that they exist “only by virtue of express
legislative enactment, creating, or authorizing the creation, of the corporate
body.”61 Alexander credits Dillon with the notion that “the power of the state
legislature over municipalities must be considered ‘supreme and transcendent.’”62
Reese echoes the inorganic quality that “[a] corporation, being an artificial creation,
is the very thing it is made by statute which brought it into being, and nothing
more.”63 Relying on Chief Justice Shaw’s opinion in Spaulding,64 Judge Dillon quoted
his honor as writing that corporations “can exercise no powers but those which are
conferred upon them by the act by which they are constituted, or such as are
necessary to the exercise of their corporate powers, the performance of their
corporate duties, and the accomplishment of the purposes of their association.”65
59. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837); Beaty v. Knowler, 29 U.S. 152
(1830); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6
U.S. 127 (1804); Estep v. Keokuk County, 18 Iowa 199 (1865); People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 188 (Ct. App. 1863);
W. Coll. of Homeopathic Med. v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375 (1861); Hood v. Mayor and Alderman of
Lynn, 83 Mass. 103 (1861); Brady v. Mayor of N.Y.C., 20 N.Y. 312 (Ct. App. 1859); Smead v. Indianapolis,
Pittsburgh & Cleveland R.R. Co., 11 Ind. 104 (1858); Appleby v. Mayor of N.Y.C., 15 How. Pr. 428 (N.Y.
1858); Mitchell v. Rockland, 45 Me. 496 (1858); Inhabitants of Cong. Twp. No. 11 v. Weir, 9 Ind. 224
(1857); Bd. of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Cty. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403 (1855); Vincent v. Inhabitants of Nantucket,
66 Mass. 103 (1853); Halstead v. Mayor of N.Y.C., 3 N.Y. 430 (Ct. App. 1850); Mayor of Albany v. Cunliff,
2 N.Y. 165 (Ct. App. 1849); Boom v. City of Utica, 2 Barb. 104 (N.Y. 1848); Boyland v. City of New York, 1
Sandf. 27 (N.Y. 1847); Hodges v. City of Buffalo, 2 Denio 110 (N.Y. 1846); Cornell & Clark v. Town of
Guilford, 1 Denio 510 (N.Y. 1845); Dill v. Wareham, 48 Mass. 438 (1844); Purdy v. People, 4 Hill. 384 (N.Y.
1842); Martin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 1 Hill 545 (N.Y. 1841); Anthony v. Adams, 42 Mass. 284 (1840);
Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71 (Mass. 1839); People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 (N.Y. 1835); Cuyler v. Trs.
of the Vill. of Rochester, 12 Wend. 165 (N.Y. 1834); Parsons v. Inhabitants of Goshen, 11 Pick. 396 (Mass.
1831); WILLCOCK, supra note 13; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 (1816). The authorities cited by Judge
Dillon also cite many other authorities. See Angell and Ames, supra note 51; Willard v. Newburyport, 29
Mass. 227 (1831); Kean v. Stetson, 22 Mass. 492 (1827); New-York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely, 5 Conn. 560
(1825); First Par. in Sutton v. Cole, 20 Mass. 232 (1825); Norton v. Mansfield, 16 Mass. 48 (1819); Bangs
v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181 (1804); People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358 (N.Y. 1818); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW (Forgotten Books 9th ed. 2012) (1858).

60. Bangs, 1 Mass. at 181; Head & Armory, 6 U.S. at 127.
61. Dillon’s Treatise, supra note 12, at 52.
62. Alexander, supra note 1, at 129.
63. REESE, supra note 16, at 4.
64. Spaulding, 23 Pick. at 74.
65. Dillon’s Treatise, supra note 12, at 102.
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In addition to hundreds of other court opinions, Dillon’s rule has also been
cited with approval and explained by the United States Supreme Court. Judge
Dillon’s opinion in Cedar Rapids was cited and quoted with approval by the high
court in Merrill and Atkin, wherein municipalities were called mere “auxiliaries” and
“agencies” of the state and “creatures of law.”66 In this respect, I disagree with
Miller’s assertion that “the [United States Supreme] Court [has] reinforced (without
directly addressing) Dillon’s rule. . . .”67 Blair and Starke accurately observe that the
“U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed Dillon’s Rule as the law of the land. . . .”68 In 1923,
the high court also cited with explicit approval, Judge Dillon’s explanation of the
rule as set forth in his cases, treatise, and commentaries.69
Banfield and Wilson, emphasizing the Trenton opinion, famously wrote that
“a city cannot operate a peanut stand at the city zoo without first getting the state
legislature to pass an enabling law . . . ,” an analysis that I urge is overbroad in the
sense that if a city has authority to establish a zoo, it is arguable that providing
refreshments for customers is incidental to its mission.70
It should be noted that there was an opposing viewpoint to Dillon’s rule that
arose about the same time in Michigan, known as the “Cooley Doctrine,” which was
articulated in a concurring opinion filed by Justice Thomas M. Cooley.71 This
doctrine held that there was an “inherent right of self-governance” for cities.72
Justice Cooley, however, later retreated from this viewpoint.73 In the Port Huron
case, he explained that “[m]unicipalities are to take nothing from the general
sovereignty except what is expressly granted.”74 The United States Supreme Court’s
opinion upholding and adopting Dillon’s rule in the Merrill and Atkin cases also
caused the Cooley Doctrine to “fade[] from prominence, at least in the courts.”75
A. The Idaho Approach
Interestingly, Idaho’s appellate courts have not actually cited the famed
Dillon’s rule cases for the proposition that municipal corporations have limited
powers. A Westlaw search revealed that no Idaho appellate court in a published
opinion has ever cited the second Dillon case, Cedar Rapids.76 The Idaho Supreme
Court cited the first Dillon case, Clark, one time, but it was cited for a proposition

66. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220–21 (1903); Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U.S. 673, 681 (1891).
67. Miller, supra note 35, at 91.
68. Blair & Starke, supra note 2, at 278.
69. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 n.1 (1923).
70. EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 64–65 (1963).
71. People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring).
72. Richardson, supra note 31, at 8.
73. Port Huron v. McCall, 10 N.W. 23, 26 (Mich. 1881).
74. Id. See also JESSE J. RICHARDSON, JR., MEGHAN ZIMMERMAN GOUGH & ROBERT PUENTES, IS HOME RULE
THE

ANSWER? CLARIFYING THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON’S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT 10 (2003),

https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-home-rule-the-answer-clarifying-the-influence-of-dillons-ruleon-growth-management/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
75. Richardson, supra note 31, at 669.
76. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
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that had nothing to do with Dillon’s rule—the legal issue of privity of contract.77
However, it is quite clear that Idaho follows Dillon’s rule, given the Black holding.78
As has been discussed, there is, however, some disagreement, both subtle and
overt, over Idaho’s status. For example, as of 2011, one scholar finds that thirtynine states accept Dillon’s rule (including Idaho), ten states reject it, and one state
(Florida) has conflicting law on the issue.79 Another scholar in 1987 asserted that
“[m]ost of the states have enacted [home rule] provisions,” and “over 80 percent
of the states reject Dillon’s rule or have modified it to constitutionally recognize the
residual powers of local government,” including Idaho, which has “used its Dillon’s
rule authority to grant shared powers,” but it is difficult to evaluate this issue with
precision.80 Richardson, Gough, and Puentes produce a table ranking of all fifty
states that shows Idaho as allowing the least discretionary authority to local
government entities.81 In a subsequent paper, Richardson (2011) sets out a table
produced by a study conducted by scholars in 2010, which ranks Idaho thirty-sixth
out of fifty states in an index based on three dimensions: (1) local government
importance; (2) local government discretion; and (3) local government capacity.82
The application of Dillon’s rule, as you can see, is rather analytically muddled.
In what I found to be the most succinct, relatively modern restatement of
Dillon’s rule in an Idaho case, the Idaho Supreme Court explained: “municipal
corporations have three sources of power and no others: (1) Powers granted in
express words; (2) Powers fairly implied in or incident to those powers expressly
granted; and (3) Powers essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation.83 Given this clear language and virtual plagiarism
77. Bush v. Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co., 43 P. 69, 70 (Idaho 1895).
78. Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992).
79. Richardson, supra note 31, at 666–67.
80. Miller, supra note 35, at 88, 92 (citing and quoting Elazar, supra note 4, at 203–05, 229–30,
n.5).
81. RICHARDSON, GOUGH, & PUENTES, supra note 74, at 27.
82. Richardson, supra note 31, at 20 (citing Harold Wolman, Robert McManmon, Michael Bell &
David Brunori, Comparing Local Government Autonomy Across States, 101 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 381
(2008)).
83. Black, 122 Idaho at 308, 834 P.2d at 310 (citing Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 795 P.2d 298, 304
(Idaho 1990)); O’Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 303 P.2d 672, 674–75 (Idaho 1956); Byrns v. City of
Moscow, 121 P. 1034, 1036 (Idaho 1912). I must confess that I was the law clerk who drafted the court’s
opinion in the Black case, for Justice Chas. F. McDevitt, and thus it holds a special place in my heart.
However, after reviewing a number of Idaho cases, it stands out to me as the most pertinent, recent,
and complete reference to Dillon’s rule. The O’Bryant case cites secondary authority for Dillon’s rule.
O’Bryant, 303 P.2d at 674–75 (citing Dillon Commentaries, supra note 11). Likewise, Dillon’s Treatise,
supra note 12, was cited and quoted with approval by the Idaho Supreme Court in Bradbury v. City of
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of Judge Dillon’s words, there can be no real doubt that Idaho is a Dillon’s rule
state.84
B. Criticism of Dillon’s Rule
In their law review article, Macdonald and Papez call Dillon’s rule the
“Antichrist” and dismiss its influence as the “19th century world-view of an Iowa
judge.”85 They also call it “[p]erhaps the single most regressive feature of the
current legal landscape surrounding the state-local government relationship. . . .”86
They argue that it was designed to address mid-19th century issues, particularly
bribes from railroad companies.87 It was “a reaction to a set of concerns that have
long since become anachronistic”88 and provided solace to “laissez-faire
extremist[s].”89 Indeed, Paul identifies Judge Dillon as a “traditional conservative[]”
who moved towards laissez-faire views “under the impact of advancing social
radicalism,” an inspiring figure to “[r]ight-wing conservatism in America,” and a
“traditional legal conservativ[e],” although it is hard to see much current meaning
in these characteristics from the mid-19th century, other than as a guide to the
perceived or wished political origin of his legal philosophy.90
Macdonald and Papez assert that Dillon’s rule “has become a tool used to
keep municipalities, often more liberal, in lock-step with state-wide thinking, often
more conservative.”91 Similarly, Richardson quotes Gere, another vociferous critic,
as calling the rule a “strait-jacket” for localities and “rigid and inflexible.”92 The
atmospherics of Gere’s anti-Dillon’s rule argument, which largely mirror the
criticisms discussed above, are summarized as “Dracula-like, sucking all autonomy
from local governments.”93 Being labeled a legal ‘Antichrist” and ‘Dracula-like” is,
in my view, wildly misleading and somewhat hysterical.
The main thrust of Macdonald and Papez is that Idaho’s courts have adopted
and followed Dillon’s rule despite the fact that Idaho’s constitution and statutes
contain provisions that should be interpreted as general grants of home rule power
to cities. First, they quote from the Idaho Constitution:

Idaho Falls, 177 P. 388, 389 (Idaho 1918), and more recently, in Caesar v. State, 610 P.2d 517, 519 (Idaho
1980).
84. RICHARDSON, GOUGH, & PUENTES, supra note 74, at 18, 42; Richardson, supra note 31, at 6.
85. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 599-600. Being called the “Antichrist” deserves multiple
mentions.
86. Id. at 599.
87. Id. at 600.
88. Id. at 609.
89. Id. at 610 (quoting Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporations: A Case Study
in Legal Change, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 369, 437 (1985) (citing ARNOLD M. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE
RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960))).
90. PAUL, supra note 89, at 29, 78–81, and 164.
91. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 612.
92. Richardson, supra note 31, at 677 (quoting Edwin A. Gere, Jr., Dillon’s Rule and the Cooley
Doctrine: Reflections of the Political Culture, 8 No. 3 J. Urb. Hist., 271-98 (1982)).
93. RICHARDSON, GOUGH, & PUENTES, supra note 74, at 7.
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LOCAL POLICE REGULATIONS AUTHORIZED. Any county or incorporated
city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local
police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its
charter or with the general laws.94
This provision has been in Idaho’s constitution since it was first adopted on
July 3,1890.95
There is nothing to assist in understanding the intent of the framers of Idaho’s
constitution in adopting this provision. It was passed unanimously, 40-0, and no
debate was recorded.96 In his tome, Idaho’s Constitution, Dennis C. Colson,
Professor of Law at the University of Idaho, simply says that section 2 of art. XII
“granted to counties and cities an inherent local police power to pass any ordinance
that did not conflict with state law.”97
Second, they quote an Idaho statute relating to the powers of municipal
corporations:
CORPORATE AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT POWERS. Cities governed
by this act shall be bodies corporate and politic; may sue and be sued;
contract and be contracted with; accept grants-in-aid and gifts of
property, both real and personal, in the name of the city; acquire, hold,
lease, and convey property, real and personal; have a common seal,
which they may change and alter at pleasure; may erect buildings or
structures of any kind, needful for the uses or purposes of the city; and
exercise all powers and perform all functions of local self-government
in city affairs as are not specifically prohibited by or in conflict with the
general laws or the constitution of the state of Idaho.98
Significantly, the emphasized language was added by the legislature in 1976,99
replacing the old language, which authorized cities to only exercise “such other
powers as may be conferred by law.”100
Macdonald and Papez take the position that Idaho should have never been a
Dillon’s rule state, or at the least it should have certainly been removed from that
94. IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added).
95. IRVING WARREN HART, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889
180, 632, 1435, and 1491 (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd. 1912).
96. Id. at 1491.
97. DENNIS C. COLSON, IDAHO’S CONSTITUTION: THE TIE THAT BINDS 197 (1991).
98. IDAHO CODE § 50-301 (2020) (emphasis added).
99. 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws 784.
100. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 606.
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category when the legislature amended the law in 1976.101 Their point is not
isolated. Stephen L. Beer wrote a law review article in 1972, before the statutory
amendment, and relied primarily upon the Idaho constitutional provision and an
old Idaho case called State v. Robbins, concluding that Idaho is or should be
considered a constitutional home rule state.102
Beer’s reliance on Robbins is, in my view, inapposite. It dealt with a state law
that authorized counties and cities to issue licenses to sell beer within their
jurisdictions, the final license to be authorized by the state commissioner of law
enforcement when presented with a valid local license.103 The applicant applied for
a license from the city of Moscow (its retail location) and the county of Latah (the
location of Moscow), receiving a license from the former but being denied by the
latter.104 The state issued its license upon receipt of the valid city license.105 The
county filed charges, and the applicant was convicted.106 The court relied upon art.
XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution to hold that the state law did not make it
mandatory that a county issue a license to a retailer located within a city, and it
made it clear that “the right to exercise the police power of the state in local police,
sanitary, and other regulations, has not been granted to counties and municipalities
by the constitution without limitation. That right is limited to such regulations as
are not in conflict with general laws.”107 This holding seems entirely consistent with
Idaho’s Dillon’s rule heritage.
Beer and, subsequently, Moore (discussed in the proceeding paragraphs),
discuss at length the history of Idaho case law on Idaho Const. art. XII, § 2 and Idaho
Code § 50-301, showing how the Dillon’s rule and Cooley doctrine spectrum has
been traversed back and forth by the Idaho Supreme Court. Beer and Moore also
take pains to explain the difference between constitutional and statutory home
rule, the former being immune from legislative whim and requiring a constitutional
amendment to change and the latter being purely subject to legislative whim; in
effect, a cloaked Dillon’s rule.108 In his 1977 article, Moore calls the 1976 statutory
amendment to Idaho Code § 50-301 “a step towards home rule,” but an
amendment that only changed the law to a “limited extent,” and that further
amendment or interpretation by the Idaho Supreme Court would be necessary to
arrive at true home rule.109
It is also noteworthy that another legal scholar has also concluded that Idaho
should be considered a home rule state due to its constitutional language.110 In
earlier editions of Antieau’s treatise, he relies on Idaho’s constitutional provision

101. Id. at 602.
102. IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2; State v. Robbins, 81 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1938); Stephen L. Beer,
Constitutional Home Rule for Idaho Cities, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 355, 368 (1972).
103. Robbins, 81 P.2d at 1078.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1080.
108. Beer, supra note 102, at 355; Moore (1977), supra note 6, at 148.
109. Moore (1977), supra note 6, at 170–71.
110. STEVENSON (ANTIEAU), supra note 10, § 21.01, at 1–12.
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and eight Idaho Supreme Court opinions to support his categorization of Idaho as a
home rule state, including the previously discussed Robbins case.111
As with Robbins, I find all of these cases distinguishable and not supportive of
a home rule categorization for Idaho. The Clark, Foster’s, Hart, Musser, Brunello,
and Ridenbaugh cases all relied extensively upon the powers granted to the city of
Boise in its charter, which it has since surrendered, and take pains to explain how
the ordinance at issue is not in conflict with the general laws of the state.112 In the
Gale opinion, the court again explained that a city ordinance requiring a liquor
license was not in conflict with state liquor laws and was clearly a “police” power
within the meaning of that word in the constitution.113 While these cases provide
some semblance of support for the notion of home rule, they rest upon unique
circumstances and cannot overcome the clear Dillon’s rule language in the Black
opinion and other Idaho Supreme Court cases.
Idaho’s courts have never expressly held that Idaho’s constitution granted
general home rule power to localities, and even the adoption of the new language
by the legislature in 1976 has not moved Idaho’s courts to change their opinion.114
Former Idaho Attorney General (and former Idaho Supreme Court Justice) Wayne
Kidwell issued an official opinion in 1976 that concluded Idaho’s constitutional
provision is only a general grant of “police powers,” and, beyond that, “Idaho cities
must look to the legislature for enabling legislation.”115 Beer even pointed to a 1969
letter opinion given by a deputy attorney general in Idaho to the mayor of Moscow,
advising that “[t]he extent of [cities’] authority must thereby be limited to the
legislative grant.”116 The term “police power” has not been well defined in this
specific context, but it is obviously something less than general power and could be
understood as “the power, inherent in the state, to make laws to restrict and
regulate, within the bounds of reasonableness and constitutional rights, the
conduct and business of individuals for the protection and promotion of public
health, safety, property, morals, and welfare.”117 In a subsequent article, Moore

111. CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW, § 3.00, at 3–4 (Matthew Bender & Co.,
1993).
112. Clark v. Alloway, 170 P.2d 425, 430-32 (Idaho 1946); Foster’s, Inc., v. Boise City, 118 P.2d
721, 725–27 (Idaho 1941); State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72, 73 (Idaho 1945); State v. Musser, 176 P.2d 199,
201–02 (Idaho 1946), abrogated by Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); State v. Brunello, 176 P.2d
212, 213 (Idaho 1946); In re Ridenbaugh, 549 P. 12, 13-14 (Idaho 1897).
113. Gale v. City of Moscow, 97 P. 828, 830–31 (Idaho 1908).
114. N. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 343 P.3d 1086, 1092-93 (Idaho 2015).
115. 1976 OP. IDAHO ATT’Y GEN. 76-3 at 9.
116. Beer, supra note 102, at 358 & note 12.
117. Moore (1977), supra note 6, at 145.
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conceded that “the Idaho Constitution makes no provision for constitutional ‘home
rule.’”118
In his 1977 article, Moore explained that Idaho only had three “true” home
rule cities, Boise, Bellevue, and Lewiston, which were chartered by Idaho’s
territorial legislature and continued in force after statehood.119 However, I do not
believe one can call them true “home rule” cities with residual powers, when their
powers were detailed in legislative charters. Moreover, the cities of Boise and
Lewiston have long since surrendered their charters, Boise via a vote of the people
of the city on August 22, 1961 (96% in favor) and legislative enactment (House Bill
101 in 1961) and Lewiston via a vote of the people of the city (82.7% in favor) on
October 14, 1969, choosing instead to become municipal corporations under Idaho
statute, primarily due to the ease of annexing new territory via the municipal
statutes.120 Tellingly, Boise’s mayor was quoted as saying that the vote “grants Boise
the long-awaited opportunity to free itself of the unnatural restrictions which have
bounded it for so many years [under a charter].”121 Bellevue, a small town in central
Idaho near the famous resort town of Sun Valley, remains the only charter city in
Idaho, and commentators have noted that annexation restrictions, which must be
approved by the legislature, may cause future problems for Bellevue.122 Thus, the
privilege of being a charter city was and is not viewed by some experts as
particularly favorable with respect to city powers.
With respect to the 1976 legislative amendment to statute, at the time of
Macdonald and Papez’s article in 2010, no Idaho court had actually interpreted the
new language.123 Yet, like the Black opinion and others discussed herein, there have
been multiple cases presented to the Idaho Supreme Court since 1976, wherein the
court could have cited the 1976 law change and authorized a locality to exercise a

118. Michael C. Moore, The Idaho Constitution and Local Governments – Selected Topics, 31 IDAHO
L. REV. 417, 420 (1995) [hereinafter Moore (1995)].
119. Moore (1977), supra note 6, at 149, citing 1866 Idaho Sess. Laws 205-09 (an act to
incorporate Boise City); Id. at 87-93 (an act to incorporate the City of Lewiston); 1883 Idaho Sess. Laws
85-119 (an act to incorporate the City of Bellevue); IDAHO CONST. art XI, § 1 and art. XXI, § 2.
120. Boiseans to Vote Today on City Charter Repeal, IDAHO DAILY STATESMAN, August 22, 1961, at
10 [hereinafter Boiseans to Vote]; Boise City Charter Dies in Lopsided Tuesday Vote; Only 151 Vote
Retention, IDAHO DAILY STATESMAN, August 23, 1961, at 28; Governor’s Signature Ends Boise Charter
Government, IDAHO DAILY STATESMAN, September 2, 1961, at 8 [hereinafter Boise Charter Dies]; Charter
Voted Out by Overwhelming Majority, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., October 15, 1969, at 12; Orchards
Annexed; Recall is Planned, Lewiston Morning Trib., December 16, 1969, at 12; H.B. 101, 36th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Idaho 1961) (an act relating to Boise City and to the charter of Boise City).
121. Boiseans to Vote, supra note 120, at 10; Boise City Charter Dies, supra note 120, at 28.
122. Kimberly Williams Brackett, Curious Mind: Bellevue Operates on Territorial Charter,
MAGICVALLEY.COM, ¶ 7, (Sept. 23, 2014), https://magicvalley.com/news/local/curious-mind-bellevueoperates-on-territorial-charter/article_dbbbdbba-42d6-11e4-8101-238882dbb260.html.
123. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 608. My own independent research on Westlaw
confirmed the observation of Macdonald and Papez at the time it was made. Subsequent to their article,
the actual meaning of this section was finally addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in N. Idaho Bldg.
Contractors Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 343 P.3d 1086, (Idaho 2015), a case which I will discuss later.
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power not specifically granted to it.124 Indeed, Michael C. Moore, a long-time Idaho
practitioner and expert on municipal law, opined in his 1977 law review article that
the statutory amendment “[is] a step toward home rule in municipal affairs.”125
Macdonald and Papez even fairly point out with some degree of irony and
frustration that the 1977 Moore article was cited in an Idaho Supreme Court
decision for the proposition that Dillon’s rule is the law in Idaho.126
Macdonald and Papez bemoan four overall aspects of Dillon’s rule in Idaho:
(1) it fails to conform to Idaho constitutional and statutory law, (2) it fails to
empower localities to deal with economic crises, (3) the reasons for creating Dillon’s
rule in the mid-1800s no longer exist, and (4) there are other constitutional and
statutory limits on local power that render Dillon’s rule to be mere “judicial
parsimony.”127 They provide as examples of potential local legislation in
contemporary times gay rights, guns, and taxes.128 To this list, I would add the
modern concept of “sanctuary cities,”129 a city minimum wage,130 and protections
124. I reviewed the court record and appellate briefs filed in the Black case, and there was no
citation or discussion of IDAHO CODE § 50-301 whatsoever, which is puzzling. Record on Appeal, Black v.
Young, 834 P.2d 304 (No. 19294) (in archival storage at the Office of the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme
Court).
125. Moore (1977), supra n.6, at 171.
126. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 608.
127. Id. at 609–10.
128. Id. at 612–14.
129. See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding Sanctuary Cities, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703 (2018)
(recent law review article providing an excellent overview of the sanctuary city phenomenon, which
dates back to the 1980s); Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Diffusion of Local Bill of Rights Resolutions to the
States, 45 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 14 (2013) (discussing the concept of sanctuary cities and the power of
cities to enact ordinances that are contrary to state or federal law). Typically, one thinks of the
relationship between the federal government and local government when it comes to sanctuary policies,
but there is always the question of whether a city has the power under state law to do any particular
thing, and there are some states that have explicitly banned sanctuary policies. Christina Goldbaum,
State Courts Become Battleground Over Trump’s Sanctuary Cities Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/nyregion/ sanctuary-cities-state-courts.html. The question of
the federal government telling local government what to do is a different issue, i.e., enforcing federal
immigration law, and is rooted in the Tenth Amendment and akin to a form of an “unfunded mandate.”
Symposium, Sanctuary Cities, 81 ALBANY L. REV. 679–720, 690, 698 (2017).
130. Indeed, on at least two occasions, the Idaho Attorney General has provided legal advice on
the issue of whether an Idaho locality could exercise the power to set its own minimum wage. Letter
from Mitchell E. Toryanski, Deputy Att’y Gen. for the Idaho Att’y Gen., to Gary J. Schroeder, State Sen.
(Oct. 23, 2006) Our File No. 2006LEG228—Minimum Wage/Cities’ Power to Mandate; Letter from Brian
Kane, Assistant Chief Deputy to the Idaho Att’y Gen., to Luke Malek, State Representative (May 13, 2015)
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for the LGBTQ community when state human rights or anti-discrimination laws do
not make them members of a protected class.131 Their solution to the continuing
recognition of Dillon’s rule is threefold: (1) a constitutional amendment that
requires a “liberal interpretation” of the existing language; (2) a statutory
amendment that also requires a liberal interpretation to the 1976 law change; and
(3) a change in course by the Idaho Supreme Court at the next available opportunity
to reject Dillon’s rule under existing Idaho law, consistent with the reasoning used
by the Utah Supreme Court in rejecting the continuing application of Dillon’s rule in
the Utah Hutchinson case.132
I distinguish Hutchinson from Idaho law because the Utah state law involved
in that case is different than Idaho’s law. I also note that Hutchison has been
restricted against applying to statutorily created entities.133 The Hutchinson case,
however, provides an excellent overview of all the criticisms of Dillon’s rule.
A.E.S. also calls for a repeal of Dillon’s rule in Virginia, pointing out the
following: (1) there are “increased expectations and [an] expanded role of modern
local government;” (2) Judge Dillon was a “skeptic of the competence of local
government;” (3) he was particularly concerned with protecting private property;
(4) it has a “low predictive value,” leaving localities guessing as to their actual
powers; (5) courts have trouble with consistency because of the need to “ferret out
legislative intent;” and (6) the competence of local government has improved,
where it is now “professionally operated” and “sophisticated.”134

Our File No. 15-51356—Minimum Wage. In both letters, the Attorney General warned that since Idaho
has enacted a statewide minimum wage law, it is likely such a municipal ordinance would not survive
legal challenge in Idaho’s courts. Idaho enacted a law in 2016 which banned political subdivisions from
setting a minimum wage. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 145, § 1, p. 412 (codified at IDAHO CODE § 441502). In a very recent letter, Assistant Chief Deputy Attorney General Brian Kane explicitly called Idaho
a “Dillon’s rule” state. Letter from Brian Kane, Assistant Chief Deputy, to Lawrence Denney, Idaho Sec’y
of State (Aug. 13, 2019) The Chief of Staff for the Boise Mayor also agreed that Idaho is a “Dillon’s rule”
state. Memorandum from Jade Riley, Chief of Staff, to the Mayor and City Council (Feb. 25, 2019).
131. Idaho has at least thirteen localities and one county that have adopted some form of
protection for the LGBTQ community. Maria L. La Ganga, Meridian Bans LGBTQ Discrimination, Sending
What

Backer

Calls

“Message

of

Inclusivity,”

IDAHO

STATESMAN

(Sept.

26,

2018),

http://www.idahostatesman.com/news/article218999140
.html; CHRISTY MALLORY & BRAD SEARS, DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER
IDENTITY IN IDAHO, WILLIAMS INST., UCLA SCH. OF L. (Sept. 2017), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Idaho-ND- September-2017.pdf.; Ada County Adds LGBTQ Status to AntiDiscrimination

Policy,

Associated

Press

(Aug.

21,

2019),

https://apnews.com/5d5f84b92acd47589cfdf3241aadbd29. Although there have been several
attempts to bring the LGBTQ issue to the state level in Idaho, the Idaho Human Rights Act has not been
amended to include it, instead applying only to the more traditional protected classes of “race, color,
religion, sex or national origin or disability” and age. IDAHO CODE § 67-5901.
132. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980); Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28, at 615–
17.
133. Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Serv. Comm’n, 917 P.2d 1082, 1084 n.3. (Utah 1996).
134. A.E.S., supra note 13, pp. 693-94, 701-05.
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In her article, Miller adds that states have found it more attractive to “devolve
power to [municipalities].”135 She also asserts that Dillon’s rule “runs counter to the
American tradition of local government.”136 She echoes A.E.S. and many others in
saying that it is difficult to identify exactly what constitutes a local power.137 She
asserts that the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger has
“curbed municipal power and set back the home rule movement”.138 Alexander
agrees with Miller’s view that the Burger Court was “extremely faithful to Dillon’s
rule.”139
C. The Legislative History of the 1976 Amendments to IDAHO CODE § 50-301
It is hornbook law that a court will not look at legislative history when it finds
a statute or constitutional provision to be clearly written.140 No Idaho cases since
the amendment of Idaho Code § 50-301 in 1976 have indicated any concern with
the clarity of the law. Nevertheless, it is interesting and provides both support for
and opposition against the Dillon’s rule critics to delve into the history of this 1976
statutory amendment, which was initially known as House Bill 422 or, previously,
RS 685.141
The statement of purpose for House Bill 422 (1976) is set forth as follows:
The purpose of this bill is to grant a limited form of local selfgovernment authority to Idaho’s cities. Currently, Idaho’s cities may
exercise only those powers and perform only those functions
135. Miller, supra note 35, at 88.
136. Id., supra note 35 at 88, citing ELAZAR, supra note 4, at 203–05.
137. Miller, supra note 35, at 88.
138. Id., at 92. The Court’s recognition on limits of city powers and the supremacy of states seems
alive and well today. Under today’s court, Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote that “in another line of cases,
we have emphasized the near-limitless sovereignty of each State to design its governing structure as it
sees fit” and “States have ‘absolute discretion’ to determine the ‘number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon [municipal corporations] and the territory over which they shall be exercised.’”
Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 327 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Alexander, supra note 1, at 135.
140. See, e.g., Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 288 P.3d 810, 814 (Idaho 2012) (citing
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (Idaho 2005)) (“Where a statute is unambiguous,
its plain language controls.”).
141. In Idaho’s legislature, an “RS” is a routing slip, accompanied by a number. It is draft
legislation, before the legislation is approved for printing as a bill, at which point a new number is
assigned. As explained on the Idaho legislature’s website, an RS is not public information until it becomes
a bill. IDAHO CODE § 74-109; RS: Draft Legislation—Not Available Until Introduced, IDAHO LEGISLATURE,
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/rs/.
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specifically mentioned in the Constitution of the State of Idaho or in the
Idaho Code. If the Constitution and the Code are silent, cities may not
act. Unlike the state government, which may exercise any power and
perform any function not prohibited by the United States Constitution,
Idaho’s cities do not have “residual powers.” They may act only if they
have been specifically authorized to act—and only in the manner
prescribed by the Idaho Constitution or the Idaho Code.
Enactment of this bill would provide Idaho’s cities with real local control
over local affairs by permitting them to exercise those powers and
perform those functions not specifically prohibited by or in conflict with
the Idaho Constitution or the Idaho Code. Because the Idaho Code is
presently so restrictive, the immediate impact of the enactment of this
bill would not be great. It would, however, establish a general
framework upon which meaningful local self-government could be
constructed over a period of time.142
The language I emphasized indicates both a desire for some degree of home
rule—“real local control” and “meaningful local self-government”—but it is still
“limited.”143 At best, one could interpret this statement to mean that local
government can act in affairs that are local in nature and not specifically prohibited
or where there is silence in the law.
The 1976 legislation was initially assigned to the House Local Government
Committee, where at its meeting on January 16, 1976, the legislation was described
as “[r]elating to self-governing powers of cities; amending section 50-311 to provide
that cities may exercise and perform all functions of local self-government.”144 Once
again, the language focuses on the “local” nature of the types of powers that may
be exercised by cities. The bill was again discussed in committee on January 20,
1976, where nothing new was said, other than the iconoclastic Representative
Perry Swisher was named its sponsor.145 The bill was successfully moved for printing
on January 21, 1976.146
In its February 4, 1976 meeting, the committee once again discussed the
legislation, receiving favorable testimony from a number of city officials. It also
received an opinion from Attorney General Wayne Kidwell, who opined that Idaho’s
existing law granted “home rule” to cities on “police powers,” so long as not

142. Idaho H.B. 422 (1976) (underline in original) (emphasis added) (Copy in possession of author.
Original in Idaho Legislative Services Library).
143. Id.
144. 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 214, p. 784 (codified as IDAHO CODE § 50-301).
145. MINUTES OF IDAHO HOUSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE, January 20, 1976 (discussing RS 685).
146. DAILY DATA, Final Edition, Forty-Third Idaho Legislature, Second Regular Session, January 5,
1976 through March 19, 1976, H422 (Copy in possession of author. Original in Idaho Legislative Services
Library).
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inconsistent with any other constitutional or statutory provision—hardly a strong
endorsement of home rule.147
The legislation was finally moved to the floor of the House with a “do pass”
recommendation in the committee meeting on February 24, 1976.148
After passing on the House floor 39-30-1,149 the legislation moved over to the
Senate and was assigned to the Local Government & Taxation Committee. There,
in its meeting on March 10, 1976, the committee heard testimony, including the
following reflected in the committee minutes by Jim Weatherby, a former political
science professor at Boise State University:
Mr. Weatherby told the committee that the purpose of this bill is to
grant a limited form of local self-government authority to Idaho cities.
Currently, Idaho’s cities may exercise only those powers and perform
only those functions specifically mentioned in the Constitution of the
State of Idaho or in the Idaho Code. Mr. Weatherby said that cities
should be given those authorities that are not granted by the
Constitution and the Idaho Code. With the passage of H 422 the
Legislature would give them home rule, then we can come back and
propose to the Legislature areas we feel that are too restrictive or in
conflict [with] the Code. This is a most limited form of home rule.150
Thus, for the first time in the printed record, the term “home rule” was used,
but it was emphasized to be a “limited” form of home rule.
In the same meeting other testimony was heard for and against the
legislation—the powerful Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry was
opposed—and one Senator, Max Yost, noted that he felt the legislation “does not
go far enough to give Idaho a good strong home rule,” and that he “believes that
Idaho does have a good basis for home rule now.”151 The legislation was ultimately

147. MINUTES OF IDAHO HOUSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE, February 4, 1976 (statement of Idaho
Deputy Att’y Gen. Wayne Kidwell).
148. MINUTES OF IDAHO HOUSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE, February 24, 1976 (discussing HB 422).
149. In my experience in Idaho’s state government, this is a very divided vote, with significant
Republican opposition in a rather conservative state. H. JOURNAL 182–83 (Idaho 1976).
150. MINUTES OF IDAHO SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT & TAXATION COMMITTEE, March 10, 1976, pp. 1–2
(testimony of Jim Weatherby).
151. Id. at 2 (statement of Max Yost, Senator, Idaho, discussing H.B. 422).
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passed out of Senate committee and on the floor,152 and was thus made into law
with the signature of Governor Andrus on March 22, 1976, effective July 1, 1976.153
Thus, the record developed in the Senate does provide some support for
Macdonald and Papez’s argument that Idaho should have always been and, after
1976, certainly should be a home rule state. Alas, Idaho’s courts have not taken the
bait.
III. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISM: THE TRUE ORIGIN OF DILLON’S RULE
It is inaccurate to attribute, expressly or by implication, the origin of the law
of limited powers for local government to a rural Iowa judge writing in the middle
of nowhere in the late-1860s. As discussed above, in his two seminal opinions Judge
Dillon himself cites a veritable plethora of pre-existing court decisions in support of
his holding.154 Most notably, in Clark, Judge Dillon references the doctrine of ultra
vires, a legal doctrine that applies to private and public corporations.155 In terms of
reported court decisions, this doctrine has been traced in the United States to the
1804 United States Supreme Court opinion in Head & Armory and the
Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion in Bangs.156 Smith and Greenblatt expressly
state that “Dillon’s [r]ule is built on the legal principle of ultra vires, which means
‘outside one’s powers.’”157 Alexander explains that the United States Supreme
Court’s eternal refusal to recognize any sovereign other than the states and the
United States “became known as the doctrine of expressed powers.”158 In Idaho,
the Supreme Court very directly emphasized Idaho’s status as a Dillon’s rule state,
using almost identical language to that set forth in Clark with no reference
whatsoever to Judge Dillon, yet called the unauthorized action of a city to be ultra
vires.159 Thus, it is more technically accurate to credit the law of limited powers for
local governmental entities to a pre-existing body of law, specifically including the
doctrines of ultra vires.160
The doctrine of ultra vires applies to all types of corporations, although due to
more recent model incorporation laws that grant private corporations the power
to do anything that is not illegal, it has largely died out in the private corporation
152. Id. Moreover, once again, the floor vote received significant opposition, but it passed 19-16.
S. JOURNAL 231–32 (Idaho 1976).
153. DAILY DATA, supra note 146.
154. Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199, 209-10 (1865); City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids &
Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 470–74 (1868).
155. Clark, 19 Iowa at 209.
156. Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. 127 (1804); Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181 (1804).
The key holding in Head & Armory is that “a corporation can only act in the manner prescribed by law.”
Head & Armory, 6 U.S. at 166. The key holding in Bangs is that “parishes had no powers except those
given by the statute[],” noting that “this doctrine has been so uniformly holden in the judicial courts.”
Bangs, 1 Mass. at 190.
157. SMITH & GREENBLATT, supra note 4, at 366.
158. Alexander, supra note 1, at 131.
159. Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992).
160. The doctrine of expressed power appears to be a slightly later name for the rule of
construction we are discussing. Barnert v. Mayor of Paterson, 6 A. 15, 15–16 (N.J. 1886).
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arena.161 It is a doctrine that clearly arose from charters and statutory enactments
permitting and governing the creation of all types of corporations—at common law,
a corporation “had the capacity of a group of natural persons, that is, a capacity to
do an unauthorized or forbidden act.”162
Thus, to argue that cities should have home rule powers is tantamount to
arguing the controversial notion that corporations are or should be the same as
people. The highly controversial Citizens United case, which held corporations to
have the same First Amendment rights as individuals, comes to mind.163 Yet, in a
United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the powers of a statutory
corporation, the Court noted that we must distinguish corporations from natural
persons as corporations must depend entirely on statute for their powers.164 In a
similar case involving the power of a state-created corporation, the Court referred
to such an entity as a “mere artificial being, invisible and intangible; yet it is a
person, for certain purposes in contemplation of law.”165 In his law treatise, Reese
explains: “A person is not confined in the exercise of his capacities to any business,
but may do any act or enter into any contract not prohibited by law. An artificial
person may do no acts nor enter into any contracts except such as are authorized
by law; the one’s power being inherent whilst the powers of the other are
conferred.”166 For limited purposes of sovereign immunity from lawsuit, L.B. Miller
points out that the United States Supreme Court has held that “a municipal
corporation possesses the status of a ‘person.’”167
Likewise, the case law of England, from which our common law is partly
derived, appears fully consistent with our own where “the common law attached
to [pre-statutory corporations] all the capacities of ordinary individuals.”168 Beattie
explains that “[s]tatutory corporations, which are the creation of more modern
legislation, are created for certain and specific purposes and . . . cannot do any acts
161. Frederick S. Kuhlman, Government Estoppel: The Search for Constitutional Limits, 25 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 229, 244 (1991); FIELD, supra note 16, at 580.
162. Robert S. Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires
Doctrine, 36 YALE L.J. 297, 298 (1927). Concomitantly, there is also no common law right to local selfgovernment – the right is purely statutory. Grumm & Murphy, supra note 30, at 121. Blackstone also
speaks of corporations acting at least in some ways as a natural person. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES,
supra note 14, at 308.
163. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310 (2010).
164. Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 67 (1827).
165. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839).
166. REESE, supra note 16, at 9.
167. Miller, supra note 35, at 87; See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977).
168. Common Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Deluxe 10th ed. 2014); DAVID J. BEATTIE, ULTRA VIRES IN
ITS RELATION TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES 1 (London: The Solicitors’ Law Stationery Society, Ltd.) (1936).
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beyond those authorized by the creative statute.”169 Beattie goes on to cite and
discuss a laundry list of English court decisions from the 1800s that applied the
doctrine of ultra vires.170 I wholly agree with the historical observation that while
initially corporations were “endowed with the same rights and subject to the same
liabilities as individuals . . . it became necessary for the public good, to restrict their
powers to narrower limits.”171
In his law treatise, Reese traces the principles of the doctrine of ultra vires in
the United States back to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Head &
Armory.172 In total, Reese discusses eleven cases which pre-date Judge Dillon’s
enunciation of the rule.173 Furthermore, he identifies the United States Supreme
Court opinion in Pearce as the “first case . . . where the doctrine of ultra vires was
directly considered.”174 The Pearce decision relied on English authority, Head &
Armory, and Perrine.175 The Perrine case involved a canal company that lacked
explicit authority via its state law charter to charge a toll to boat passengers, and
the Court cited several prior opinions and recognized: “Now it is the well-settled
doctrine of this court, that a corporation created by statute is a mere creature of
the law, and can exercise no powers except those which the law confers upon it, or
which are incident to its existence.”176
Reese also identifies Thomas as an ultra vires origin case that had probably
been cited more often than any other case for the doctrine at that time.177 With
respect to municipal corporations, he cites a veritable laundry list of court opinions
that pre-date Judge Dillon’s pronouncement for the proposition that “[m]unicipal
corporations can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted to them, or
such as are necessary to carry into effect those that are granted.”178

169. BEATTIE, supra note 168, at 2.
170. Id.
171. Charles Henry Parshall, Ultra Vires, (June 1891) (unpublished historical thesis, Cornell Law
School) (on file with Cornell Law Library, Cornell Law School). It should be noted that Parshall discusses
two legal terms historically related to ultra vires, “mala prohibita” and “quo warranto.” Id. at 2 and 26.
As he explains, the initial statutes governing corporations listed specific prohibitions, and mala prohibita
simply means any action that goes against a statute. Malum Prohibitum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Deluxe
10th ed. 2014). “Quo warranto” was simply an old “common law writ used to inquire into the authority
by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed.” Quo Warranto, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Deluxe
10th ed. 2014); Parshall, supra at 26–27.
172. REESE, supra note 16, § 21, at 30; Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. 127 (1804).
173. REESE, supra note 16, §§ 21–31, at 30–39.
174. REESE, supra note 16, § 30, at 37–38; Pearce v. Madison & Indianapolis R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 441
(1858).
175. Pearce, 62 U.S. at 444 (citing Eastern Anglian Railway Co. v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., 11
C.B. 775, 803 (1851); Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. 127 (1804); Perrine v. Chesapeake &
Delaware Canal Co., 50 U.S. 172 (1850)).
176. Perrine, 50 U.S. at 184.
177. REESE, supra note 16, § 35, at 43-45; Thomas v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 71, 83 (1879).
178. REESE, supra note 16, § 170, at 232 n.4. In the modern seminal multi-volume legal treatise on
municipal law, McQuillin extensively discusses the doctrine of ultra vires. 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53:77.28 (3rd ed. 2013).
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Reese also eloquently sets forth what he calls the “alpha” and “omega” of the
doctrine of ultra vires:
[The alpha] is that a contract by which a corporation disables itself from
performing its functions and duties undertaken and imposed by its
charter is, unless the state which created it consents, ultra vires. A
charter not only grants rights, it also imposes duties. An acceptance of
those rights is an assumption of those duties. . . . It is not like a deed or
patent, which vests in the grantee or patentee not only title but full
power of alienation, but it is more—it is a contract whose obligations
neither party, state nor corporation, can, without the consent of the
other, abandon. [The omega] is that the powers of a corporation are
such, and such only, as the charter confers; and an act beyond the
measure of those powers, as either expressly stated or fairly implied, is
ultra vires. A corporation has no natural or inherent rights or capacities.
Created by the state, it has such powers as the state has seen fit to give
it—only this and nothing more. And so when it assumes to do that
which it has not been empowered by the state to do, its assumption of
powers is void, the act is a nullity; the contract is ultra vires.179
Some modern non-legal scholars, including Grumm and Murphy, Wood, and
Richardson, have also recognized the source of Dillon’s rule as an application of the
doctrine of ultra vires. Grumm and Murphy explain that, historically speaking,
“unless a locality could convincingly demonstrate otherwise, the presumption was
that it had acted ultra vires.”180 Grumm and Murphy also describe the rationale of
Dillon’s rule as arising from a “general doctrine of state supremacy” and a “doctrine
of expressed powers.”181 Wood bluntly states that “[h]istorically, local governments
have been subject to the Ultra Vires Rule (also known as Dillon’s rule).”182 Likewise,
Richardson admits that “the idea of state control over local governments existed
long before Judge Dillon articulated the rule.”183 He points to an 1816 opinion from
the Massachusetts Supreme Court, wherein the court held:
The right of towns to grant or raise money . . . is certainly derived from
statute. Their corporate powers depend upon legislative charter or
179. REESE, supra note 16, § 19, at 29.
180. Grumm & Murphy, supra note 30, at 124.
181. Id. at 123.
182. Curtis Wood, Exploring the Determinants of the Empowered U.S. Municipality, 43 ST. & LOC.
GOV’T REV. 123, 123 (2011).
183. Richardson, supra note 31, at 665.
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grant . . . . But, in all cases, the powers of towns are defined by the
statute . . . .
...
For the powers of towns, as well as parishes, are either entirely derived
from some legislative act, or defined and limited by the general statutes
prescribing the powers and duties . . . .
...
[I]n the present state of the law; towns now being the creatures of
legislation, [are] enjoying only the powers which are expressly granted
to them.184
Finally, Alexander provides a detailed outline of ultra vires:
Activities other than those expressly authorized would be considered
ultra vires (i.e., beyond the express range of municipal jurisdiction and
authority and thereby without legal effect). Ultra vires not only
constrained municipal action within that authority expressly delegated
by the state legislature, but also restrained a state from empowering a
municipality to exercise broad authority outside the range of matters
generally understood to be “purely local” in nature.185

A. Reasons Supporting Dillon’s Rule and the Doctrines of Ultra Vires and Expressed
Power
In one of the earliest cases on the subject, the Parsons case, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in somewhat paternalistic fashion and using the
vernacular of the time, explained the reasoning behind limited powers:
This limitation upon the power and authority of towns to enter into
contracts and stipulations is a wise and salutary provision of law, not
only as it protects the rights and interests of the minority of legal voters,
but as it may not [unfrequently] prove beneficial to the interests of the
majority, who may be hurried into rash and unprofitable speculations
by some popular and delusive excitement, to the influence of which
even wise and considerate men are sometimes liable.186
A.E.S., while calling for reform of Dillon’s rule in Virginia, notes that it is
endowed with various positive qualities, including: (1) it reinforces state
184. Id. (citing Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 278, 281, and 284 (1816)).
185. Alexander, supra note 1, at 130 (citing Dillon’s Treatise, supra note 12, § 381, at 374–76).
186. Parsons v. Inhabitants of Goshen, 11 Pick. 396, 406 (Mass. 1831).
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sovereignty; (2) it can protect individual and state interests; and (3) it can protect
minority and state policy interests from local biases.187 Indeed, if one considers the
(in)famous red-blue map of American counties or precincts in recent presidential
elections, there are undoubtedly many more smaller towns that might love to
implement more politically conservative ordinances.188 A.E.S. also concedes that

187. A.E.S., supra note 13, at 707.
188. Indeed, a number of local governmental entities have enacted “Second Amendment
sanctuary” or sanctuary-like ordinances and resolutions, including the cities of Star, Nampa, Kuna, and
Eagle, Idaho. Katherine Rosenberg-Douglas, Second Amendment ‘Sanctuary County’ Movement Expands
as

Organizers

Take

Aim

at

New

Gun

Laws,

CHI.

TRIB.

(Apr.

17,

2019),

https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-second-amendment-sanctuary-countymovement- illinois-20190416-story.html; Thomas Plank, Star Passes Second Amendment Sanctuary City
Resolution;

Becomes

1st

Idaho

City

to

do

so,

IDAHO

PRESS

(July

23,

2020),

https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/star-passes-second-amendment-sanctuary-city-resolutionbecomes-1st-idaho-city-to-do-so/article_702cea18-a0d5-574b-be2e-c033ccb04323.html; Kate Talerico,
Second Boise Suburb Declares Itself “2nd Amendment Sanctuary City.” What That Means, IDAHO
STATESMAN

(Sept.

11,

2020),

https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/community/west-

ada/article245584005.html; David Statts, “What We Are All About:” Idaho’s 3rd Largest City Declares
Itself

2nd

Amendment

City,

IDAHO

STATESMAN

(Nov.

3,

2020),

https://idahostatesman.com/article246933677.html; Hayley Harding, This Idaho Town Becomes the
Newest “Second Amendment Sanctuary City.” What that Means, IDAHO STATESMAN (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www. Idahostatesman.com/news/local/community/west-ada/article248272655.html. A recent
article claims that “[t]here are currently more than a dozen Second Amendment sanctuary cities and
counties in Idaho.” Brian Holmes, Can Idaho cities and counties legally declare themselves to be “Second
Amendment sanctuaries?”, KTVB, https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/local/208/can-idaho-cities-andcounties-legally-declare-themselves-to-be-second-amendment-sanctuaries/277-5f98bce3-78cb-45e0babb-310c2cde6ac8. Second Amendment sanctuaries are facing their first court challenge in Oregon.
Lindsay Whitehurst & Andrew Selsky, Second Amendment sanctuaries facing 1st court test in Oregon,
Associated

Press

(May

16,

2021),

https://apnews.com/article/us-news-oregon-gun-politics-

government-and-politics-1dec173dc5d6d7d5f343b933bb883368.
Likewise, a town in Texas enacted a “sanctuary city for the unborn” ordinance. Ryan W. Miller,
Sanctuary City for the Unborn: All-Male City Council in Texas Town Bans Most Abortions, USA TODAY (June
13,

2019),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/06/13/waskom-texas-declared-

sanctuary-city-unborn-bans-abortion/1443699001/.
Finally, the state of Florida banned sanctuary cities for illegal immigration purposes. Frank Miles,
Florida Legislature Passes GOP Ban on Sanctuary-City Policies; DeSantis Expected to Sign into Law, FOX
NEWS (May 2, 2019), https://foxnews.com/politics/florida-legislature-passes-gop-ban-on-sanctuarycity-policies-desantis-to-sign-into-law.print. These political back and forth potshots are, in my view, a
danger of home rule.
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some type of judicial review is important to hold in check local authority, although
a “reasonableness standard” would be preferable.189
From a more historical standpoint, Willcock credits the invention of municipal
corporations via charter or legislative act with being a chief reason behind the
demise of feudalism.190 He also emphasizes that the whole reasoning behind
municipal corporations was to regulate internal, local affairs, thus not stepping into
deeper minefields of policy.191
Beer, himself an advocate for home rule in Idaho, acknowledged that home
rule does not work when the people do not educate themselves on the issues and
participate in the governing process, leading to corruption and inefficiency.192
Finally, I urge policymakers to carefully consider the extent to which they want
to create more virtual sovereign entities in the United States. How many sovereigns
should lord over the people? In Idaho alone, the Association of Idaho Cities and the
Idaho Blue Book identify two hundred incorporated cities.193 Do we really want to
turn local entities into virtual natural beings with inherent powers? Do we really
want to broach the “fundamental question of the constitutional relationship
between states and their political subdivisions”?194 Would home rule encourage
cities to return to their scandalous behaviors that some claim inspired the rule?
Should a city be allowed, for example, to increase the penalties associated with
DUIs because it believes harsher punishment is warranted in a more densely
populated, high-traffic and pedestrian urban area? Where a legislature has
legislated (or declined to legislate) in an area, should cities be allowed to
supplement or change that legislation? For example, in Idaho, should cities be able
to expand human rights law to the LBGTQ community where the legislature has
comprehensively enacted state human rights legislation? What is the difference, if
any, between this example and the issue of whether Idaho cities may impose a
different minimum wage than that set by the Idaho legislature? Recently, in Idaho,
the city of Meridian banned the use of cell phones while driving, even though the
legislature passed a less restrictive measure and rejected a stricter measure as an
“overreach.”195
The recent resurgence in the “sanctuary city” movement, largely considered
to be a left-wing mechanism used by big cities, has spawned right-wing action in
many other municipalities, including banning abortion and gun ownership

189. A.E.S., supra note 13, at 709.
190. WILLCOCK, supra note 13, at 1.
191. Id. at 16–17.
192. Beer, supra note 102, at 357.
193. Cities in Idaho, ASS’N OF IDAHO CITIES, https://idahocities.org/page/Cities (last visited Oct. 29,
2020); 2019–2020 IDAHO BLUE BOOK, at 280, https://sos.idaho.gov/blue_book/2020/06_County.pdf.
194. Alexander, supra note 1, at 127.
195. Kate Talerico, Meridian Bans Handheld Phone Use When Driving. Here’s When You’ll Start
Getting

Tickets,

IDAHO

STATESMAN

(Oct.

22,

2019,

7:56

https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/community/west-ada/article236547348.html.

PM),
The

Idaho Legislature recently passed legislation regulating usage of cell phones while driving, specifically
preempting local ordinances. An Act Relating to Motor Vehicles of 2020, H.B. 614, 65th Legislature, §
2(10) (Idaho 2020) (codified at IDAHO CODE § 49-1401A).
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restrictions.196 Florida specifically banned sanctuary cities.197 Where should a line,
if any, be drawn? These are broad policy questions, and I urge that care be given
before altering the fundamental architecture of American federalism.
B. Ultra Vires in Idaho
In the Black opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court, after setting forth the sources
of local governmental power consistent with Dillon’s rule, specifically held that an
ordinance of the City of Ketchum was “ultra vires.”198 A Westlaw review of Idaho
case law using the term “ultra vires” and dealing with local governmental entities
revealed a total of thirty-four published opinions dealing with local government
entities and ultra vires.199 One of the gurus of political science in Idaho and longtime
University of Idaho professor Sidney Duncombe acknowledged that “[c]ity
governments . . . are governed primarily under state laws and constitutional
provisions” and “the powers of cities and other local governments have been
strictly construed by the courts.”200
The Black opinion remains controlling case law in Idaho. It has been cited in
seven court decisions. Most recently, in In re Old Cutters, Inc., the federal district
court in Idaho extensively cited the Black case—including its reliance on the
doctrine of ultra vires—in evaluating whether the city of Hailey could add a couple
conditions to an annexation ordinance that went beyond Idaho’s annexation
statute.201 Significantly, the city of Hailey argued that while the annexation statute
did not expressly permit the conditions, it nevertheless had such authority by virtue
of the 1976 amendment to section 50-301 of the Idaho Code.202 United States
District Judge Edward J. Lodge (a former Idaho state court judge), rejected this
assertion: “If I.C. § 50-301 permitted a city to contract for any conditions it wanted
without specific authority for imposing such conditions in another statute, a city’s

196. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 188 (banning most abortions); Rosenberg-Douglas, supra note
188 (banning gun ownership restrictions).
197. Miles, supra note 188.
198. Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992) (citing Mix v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Nez Perce
City, 112 P. 215, 218 (Idaho 1910)). I note that the Black decision was a 5-0 unanimous opinion, decided
by five justices who were all appointed by Democrat governors.
199. See, e.g., Chavez v. Canyon Cty., 271 P.3d 695 (Idaho 2012); Willson v. Boise City, 55 P. 887
(Idaho 1899).
200. SIDNEY DUNCOMBE & ROBERT WEISEL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN IDAHO AND IN THE NATION 116
(University of Idaho Press) (1984).
201. In re Old Cutters, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-00057-EJL, 2014 WL 1319854 at *14–18 (D. Idaho Mar.
31, 2014), dismissed (Nov. 26, 2014).
202. Id. at 19.

372

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

power would be endless. . . . Hailey cannot rely upon I.C. § 50-301 for [its acts].”203
While a federal district court decision is not controlling authority for the existence
of Idaho law, it is nonetheless persuasive and certainly not inconsistent with any
Idaho court decision.204
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has also weighed in on the meaning of
section 50-301. In the North Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n opinion, the Idaho
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 1976 amendment to the statute
gives cities the power to levy any taxes necessary to exercise its powers.205 While it
could certainly be argued that this case is limited to the power to tax, it nevertheless
relied upon the existing, controlling jurisprudence relative to Dillon’s rule in
refusing to grant a power under the language added to the statute in 1976,206
leaving the statutory amendment functionally meaningless. While the court did not
specifically raise the doctrine of ultra vires, the court’s reasoning is fully consistent
with the Black opinion.207 The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in this case also
validates Judge Lodge’s decision in the In re Old Cutters, Inc., federal district court
case.208
Curiously, Macdonald and Papez fail to cite the Black case or discuss the
doctrine of ultra vires.209 They suggest that the law relating to the power of local
governmental entities was created by an Iowa judge in the mid-1800s in response
to the bribery abuses perpetrated by railroad companies against local
governmental entities.210 It is my position that this law traces itself back at least fifty
years before Judge Dillon’s famous cases (and probably much older than that) and
goes hand-in-hand with the corporate law doctrine of ultra vires, the doctrine of
expressed power, and the notion that statutory municipal corporations are not
natural persons.
Finally, while not specifically mentioning ultra vires, the Black opinion, or
Dillon’s rule, the Idaho Supreme Court quite recently denied the city of Pocatello
the power to profit in excess of the amounts necessary for the water and sewer
systems to remain self-supporting—no statute gave it that authority, a clearly ultra
vires-style holding.211
C. The Ciszek Case: An Opening for Home Rule in Idaho?
The discussion thus far has emphasized the reality that Idaho has long been a
Dillon’s rule state (with a few outlying cases that muddle things up), employing the
doctrine of ultra vires to limit local authority. However, in 2011, the Idaho Supreme
Court came down with a rather curious opinion, a coup de main of sorts, that evokes
203. Id.
204. Id.; See Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992).
205. N. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 343 P.3d 1086, 1093 (Idaho 2015).
206. Id.
207. Cf. Black, 834 P.2d at 310.
208. In re Old Cutters, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-00057-EJL, 2014 WL 1319854 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2014),
dismissed (Nov. 26, 2014).
209. Macdonald & Papez, supra note 28.
210. Id. at 600.
211. Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park v. City of Pocatello, 402 P.3d 1041 (Idaho 2017).
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the wanderings of the Idaho Supreme Court across the Dillon’s rule and Cooley
doctrine spectrum, as pointed out by Beer and Moore.212 The Ciszek case dealt with
a county board of commissioners’ decision to rezone several parcels, and whether
such “swap zoning” is authorized by statute, specifically the Idaho Local Land Use
Planning Act.213
Without any reference whatsoever to the Black line of holdings, the court
immediately arrived at the following holdings, suggesting that perhaps some type
of home rule is constitutional in nature in Idaho:
Idaho counties exercise police powers of the State pursuant to a
constitutional grant of authority. “Any county or incorporated city or
town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police,
sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or
with the general laws.” Idaho Const. art. XII, § 2 . . . .
While a local governing body must comply with the procedural and
substantive provisions of LLUPA, its authority in the land use arena is
not derived solely from LLUPA. Rather, cities and counties of this State
have traditionally exercised their constitutional police powers to
provide for planning and zoning activities in their jurisdictions and,
therefore, their ability to act is not confined to only those actions
specifically mentioned in LLUPA.214
To support this holding, the court cited its prior decision in Plummer.215
Therein, the court found that a city had the power to grant an “exclusive solid waste
collection franchise” even though it lacked any express or implied statutory
authority to do so.216 The court explained that “[i]n other words, the constitutional
grant of authority to exercise general police powers was recognized as a broader
grant of authority than those powers specifically articulated in statute” and the
power itself was not expressly prohibited by statute.217 Finally, in a somewhat
sweeping statement that guides future court reviews of local government action,
the Idaho Supreme Court held: “So long as the actions of local governing boards are
not unreasonable, i.e., arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, and bear a
212. Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm’rs, 254 P.3d 24 (Idaho 2011).
213. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6501 to 6539 (2020) (Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act) [hereinafter
LLUPA].
214. Ciszek, 254 P.3d at 32.
215. Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 87 P.3d 297 (Idaho 2004).
216. Plummer, 87 P.3d at 300.
217. Ciszek, 254 P.3d at 32.
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‘substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare,’
local governing boards act within their constitutional authority.”218
The Ciszek case is somewhat startling and difficult to reconcile with Black,
perhaps even antithetical in analysis. Yet, it did not overrule or even mention Black.
The court should have distinguished how the statutory process for the vacation of
streets with added conditions in Black differs from the rezoning process that
arguably did not strictly follow its statutory process, i.e., distinguished the cases. In
Ciszek, the court also recognized that a statute can expressly prohibit certain
conduct.219 Indeed, in the In re Old Cutters, Inc. federal bankruptcy court case, the
court distinguished and limited the Ciszek opinion to cases where a city is not
violating a statute.220 I believe Ciszek may provide a basis for some degree of
constitutional home rule authority, although there is plenty of contrary, controlling
authority in Idaho and a governing board would be wise to pick and choose its
battles carefully.221
Idaho is a Dillon’s rule state, and any suggestion otherwise is chimerical. The
court did not cross the Rubicon in Ciszek. Yet, the court has indicated some degree
of home rule-like authority over local matters in Ciszek, with the proviso of not
conflicting with the general laws of the state,222 a nuance that, to me, negates or
swallows true home rule almost entirely. I completely agree with Moore’s 1995
view that a city simply cannot violate a state law.
IV. THE ARGUABLE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF DILLON’S RULE
When it comes to discussing localities and the United States Constitution, it is
critical to begin with the understanding that, unlike the states, there is no
acknowledgment whatsoever of local government in our nation’s guiding
document.223 While local entities “are undeniably public actors,” there is no status
for them under the United States Constitution.224 They are mere “political
subdivisions” of the states, which are unconstrained in making them, but “they are
not sovereign entities” or “equivalent to the states themselves.”225 As Justice
Kennedy remarked, “[t]he Framers split the atom of sovereignty” into one nation
and the states, no more and no less.226
218. Ciszek, 254 P.3d at 33 (citing and quoting Dry Creek Partners v. Ada County Comm’rs, 217
P.3d 1282, 1290 (Idaho 2009). I would distinguish the Dry Creek case as one that dealt with the
application of the county’s zoning code, not LLUPA or state law. Dry Creek, 217 P.3d at 1290.
219. Ciszek, 254 P.3d at 32.
220. In re Old Cutters, Inc., 488 B.R. 130, 151–55 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012) aff'd, 2014 WL 1319854
(D. Idaho 2014), dismissed (Nov. 26, 2014).
221. See, e.g., Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992); Caesar v. State, 610 P.2d 517, 519
(Idaho 1980); Bradbury v. City of Idaho Falls, 177 P. 388, 389 (Idaho 1918); Mix v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Nez
Perce City, 112 P. 215, 218 (Idaho 1910).
222. Ciszek, 254 P.3d at 32–33.
223. Miller, supra note 35, at 87.
224. Alexander, supra note 1, at 133.
225. Miller, supra note 35, at 87, 90.
226. Lydia R. Wilson & Robert McCreight, supra n.53, at 7; U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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While no court has specifically held that the limited powers of local
government are derived and protected by the United States Constitution, it is
arguable that such a basis exists. Smith and Greenblatt recognize the connection
between Dillon’s rule and the Tenth Amendment.227 Richardson argues that Dillon’s
rule “relates to the separation of powers” and “[i]n effect, Dillon’s rule merely
reflects settled legal principles derived, in part, from the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.”228 The Tenth Amendment embodies the American
tradition of federalism, providing “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”229 Indeed, Richardson says that the critics of Dillon’s
rule should aim their bow at the Tenth Amendment, not court decisions.230
Richardson’s assertion is supported to some degree by the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in the Community Communications opinion.231
Therein, the Court described “the federalism principle that we are a Nation of
States, a principle that makes no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of
States.”232 More expansively, the Court explained:
Ours is a “dual system of government,” which has no place for
sovereign cities. As this Court stated long ago, all sovereign authority
“within the geographical limits of the United States” resides either with:
“The Government of the United States, or [with] the States of the
Union. There exists within the broad domain of sovereignty but these
two. There may be cities, counties, and other organized bodies with
limited legislative functions, but they are all derived from, or exist in,
subordination to one or the other of these.” We are a nation not of
“city-states” but of States . . . . It was expressly recognized by the
plurality opinion in City of Lafayette that municipalities ‘are not
themselves sovereign.’233
Alexander emphasizes the Community Communications opinion, which dealt
with the liability for private damages while operating in the course of their public
functions, as holding that “general enabling statutes extending home-rule powers
to municipalities did not constitute a sufficient legal basis for a municipality to argue
227. SMITH & GREENBLATT, supra note 4, at 365.
228. Richardson, supra note 31, at 3, 5.
229. U.S. Const. amend X.
230. Richardson, supra note 31, at 21.
231. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
232. Id. at 50 (emphasis in original).
233. Id. at 53–54 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400
(1978) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
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that its particular activities were in pursuance of an expressed state policy.”234 In
other words, home rule statutes do not appear to matter to the high court. This
result seems to naturally flow from the reality that “municipalities have never been
accorded independent sovereign status.”235 Similarly, in the Hunter opinion, the
Court held municipal corporations to be “political subdivisions of the state, created
as convenient agencies,” and that the state has “absolute power” over
municipalities.236 Richardson, Gough, and Puentes also cite the Tenth Amendment
as the basis for the law of limited powers for local government entities.237 Grumm
and Murphy imply that statutory language that purports to grant localities powers
not expressly prohibited by statute abrogates the Tenth Amendment.238
Additionally, it is a “variant on the Tenth Amendment,” and “the most direct
contravention of Dillon’s rule thus far devised.”239
I do not mean to conclude that the Tenth Amendment necessarily prohibits
granting home rule powers to localities, but it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court
of the United States and some scholars have drawn a direct line between the limited
powers of local government and the Tenth Amendment. This raises the specter of
a state’s general grant of powers to localities being a sort of unconstitutional
delegation of state powers as embodied in the Tenth Amendment. The extent to
which this is done may be the key. It is important to acknowledge that the Supreme
Court has upheld some express grants of home rule powers, where the broadest
form of home rule authority was called “imperium in imperio.”240 Again, I
acknowledge that this argument may be rather novel, but I do believe it flows from
critical historical, academic, and jurisprudential support for Dillon’s rule and ultra
vires as applied to local government. Moreover, this argument may also shed some
light on what has driven the Idaho Supreme Court to refuse to grant general powers
to localities under both the Idaho Constitution and 1976 statute.
V. CONCLUSION
There is much to agree with in the views expressed by Macdonald and Papez
as well as other critics. The thrust of their argument is eminently reasonable.
However, I urge that tracing and dismissing the law of limited powers for local
government to a rural Iowa judge—impliedly an uncultured simpleton acting on
234. Alexander, supra note 1, at 135.
235. Id. at 128.
236. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907).
237. RICHARDSON, GOUGH, & PUENTES, supra note 74, at 3.
238. Grumm & Murphy, supra note 30, at 126.
239. Id. at 126.
240. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893). Even in this case, a
constitutionally-chartered city was still subject to the Constitution and laws of the state. Thus, even the
broadest form of home rule is still subject to the whims of the legislature, a beguiling yet illusory and
symbolic form of power. This is the reality with home rule—it is always subject to legislative change,
thus a somewhat circular dynamic. “Imperium in imperio” is defined as “a government, power, or
sovereignty within a government, power, or sovereignty.” Imperium in imperio, MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imperium%
20in%20imperio (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).

2021

JUDGE DILLON DID NOT INVENT DILLON’S RULE:
ORIGINS, ULTRA VIRES AND EXPRESSED POWER
FOR MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN THE CONTEXT
OF CRITICISM CALLING FOR HOME RULE POWER,
FOCUSED ON IDAHO

377

then-current concerns—is simply inaccurate. The relevant academic and legal
literature discussed in this paper trace this body of law to an earlier time vis-à-vis
the doctrines of ultra vires and expressed power as well as other expressions of
limited municipal corporation powers.241
In addition, their point concerning Idaho’s courts failing to interpret Idaho
Code §50-301 is no longer true, and the courts thus far have not agreed with their
assertion that the 1976 amendment changed Idaho law.242 It almost goes without
saying that it is somewhat absurd that a successful legislative change to the law
would carry no meaning. Put another way, it is axiomatic that a law change, unless
technical or clean-up in nature, must result in some kind of substantive change in
the law. The doctrine of legislative knowledge holds that “the legislature is
knowledgeable about all existing law relating to its pending bills.”243 Why would a
legislature amend a statute without intending to alter its meaning somehow? In this
case, given the recorded testimony, it appears that some kind of change was
intended.
Richardson explains that the issue of limited local powers really was not
controversial until the mid-1800s.244 He explained that it was at this time that cities
and society began growing and changing at a rapid rate, and state legislatures began
taking action by enacting laws specifically designed to limit local authority.245 In
addition, it was also during this time period that “widespread corruption in
municipalities” heightened relevancy of the limited powers rule.246 Grumm and
Murphy explain the context of the time as rapid population growth of cities,
increasing immigration and migration, and extensive economic activities, all of
which coalesced to place new demands upon local government.247 Richardson,
Gough, and Puentes remind us that the era was filled with “widespread corruption
in municipalities.”248
While the various criticisms of the law outlined by Macdonald and Papez are
certainly reasonable in nature, there are also a variety of reasonable arguments in
support of what we call Dillon’s rule and against home rule power.249
241. See, e.g., Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181 (1804); Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S.
127 (1804); BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 14, at 308; Brice, supra note 14, at 16; Colman v.
Eastern Counties Railway Co., 10 Beav. 1 (1846); Eastern Anglian Railway Co. v. Eastern Counties Railway
Co., 11 C.B. 775 (1851); KAMES, supra note 14, at 201.
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With respect to the disagreement and confusion concerning how many states
follow Dillon’s rule, it is my belief that only a comprehensive examination of each
state’s constitution, statutes, and case law, and perhaps actual policies and
practices in the cities, would be the best way to evaluate this issue. Dillon’s rule and
the Cooley Doctrine are Manichean and reside on the opposite ends of a spectrum.
Charter cities and home rule reside somewhere inside the spectrum (with home
rule itself taking up sizeable space on that spectrum, depending upon its extent),
and the 50 states are spread across that spectrum at several points.250
Moreover, while I in no way mean to diminish the work and resulting
immortality of Judge Dillon and his oeuvre on municipal law, the law of limited
power for local governmental entities is quite a bit more complicated and older,
coming from clearly more cosmopolitan jurisdictions than Iowa, than presented by
Macdonald and Papez, and it remains controlling law in Idaho.251 I acknowledge the
persuasive legal reasoning of Macdonald and Papez with respect to the language in
the Idaho Constitution and 1976 Idaho statute, and if I was advising the Legislature
on how best to protect the application of Dillon’s rule or ultra vires in Idaho, I would
recommend they change the language in both provisions. It would not surprise me
if an Idaho court one day agrees with the reasoning used by Macdonald and Papez.
While the discussion appears in addressing private corporations, Swaney also
discusses municipal corporations, and I think his introductory comment is
profound:
A corporation is an artificial person created by law for a specific
purpose, with such a grant of privileges as secures a succession of
members without losing its identity. It exists independent of the
persons who compose it, but has no existence independent of the acts
creating it, and derives all its powers from those acts, and its powers
are specifically granted and can only be exercised for the purposes
contemplated.252
Moreover, while again specifically addressing private corporations, I find one
of his supporting reasons for the doctrine of ultra vires to be entirely applicable to
municipal corporations: “By tolerating ultra vires acts, the powers of corporations
would be extended indefinitely, and might jeopardize the sovereign power which
created them.”253
Judge Dillon is iconic. I am not on a mission to dismiss him, but instead aim to
correct the historical record. In my view, in addition to Dillon’s commendable
works, the most prominent and early legal bases for limited local powers are
Blackstone’s Commentaries, the Stetson, Bangs, and Head & Armory court
decisions (with the Black and Ciszek lines of cases being paramount in Idaho), and
constitutional and statutory provisions. The doctrine of ultra vires applied to

250. See discussion supra notes 79, 80, 81, 82.
251. Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (Idaho 1992).
252. SWANEY, supra note 52, at 1 (footnotes and citations omitted).
253. Id. at 2.
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municipal corporations originated earlier than Dillon’s pronouncements.254 I will
continue to call it “Dillon’s rule” and ultra vires, but I will do so knowing he drew
from an extensive and existing line of law to formulate his succinct articulation of
the rule of strict construction of limited power for local government entities. Law
that remains controlling in Idaho.

254. See, e.g., Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181 (1804).

